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Abstract
This  article  analyzes  quantitatively  and  qualitatively  1,583  comments  by
national  newspapers’  online  readers  in  Bulgaria.  It  investigates  readers’
reactions  to  articles  discussing  the  media  war  between  the  biggest  press
groups—one owned by an MP known as “the Murdoch of the East.” The study
explores  how these stories  influence the relationship  between newspapers
and  their  readers,  and  whether  they  enhance  the  democratic  potential  of
online discussion. The results show a higher level of reader engagement than
in established democracies or nondemocracies. The online space provides an
arena  for  democratic  conversations  and  it  is  also  used  as  an  engine  for
conspiracy theories.
Keywords
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The year 2014 marked the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Two key
developments of the last 25 years are of particular interest  for this article.  On one
hand, in spite of the significant changes democratization brought about in Eastern and
Central  Europe,  most  notably  freedom of  expression  and  free  media  markets,  the
global financial crisis led to a worrying “regional trend” (Štětka, 2012). Prior to 2008,
a lot of media companies were in the hands of foreign owners, but many subsequently
withdrew due to financial difficulties. Many big media corporations are now owned by
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local businessmen with strong political interests (Štětka, 2012). As a result, as Štětka
(2012) claims, “media independence and autonomy are currently at stake,” because
journalists “are under twofold pressures from politicians and media owners, who are
often  interlocked  in  an  informal  power  alliance.”  “Media  freedom  and  pluralism
appear to be in jeopardy” in Bulgaria mainly due to the increasing influence of one
media group (New Bulgarian Media Group [NBMG]) and its alleged owner—an MP
labeled as “the Murdoch of the East” (Štětka, 2012). Pressure escalated at the end of
2010 when the German company Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ) refused to
sell the other big player in the market—Media Group Bulgaria (MGB)—to the MP’s
corporation and instead sold it to a newly formed company. This prompted an open
verbal  war  between  the  two biggest  press  groups,  which  lasted  until  2013 (when
ownership changed hands again) and was largely led on the pages of their newspapers
and on TV. The war quickly transcended into the political and judicial realms—key
scandals  revolved  around  the  political  career  of  “the  Murdoch  of  the  East,”  the
depositing of more than 50% of public money in a bank owned by his alleged partner,
charges pressed for money laundering and fraud against their rivals, and allegations
about  the  Prime Minister’s  involvement  in  these  “battles.”  Although a  number  of
studies have investigated the media landscape in Eastern Europe, no known study has
looked at  audiences’  perceptions of those worrying developments or the role these
largely negative stories play in the relationship between newspapers and readers.
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On the other hand, a key change the digital age has brought about is the alleged
empowerment of media users via the ample interaction and engagement opportunities
the Internet and mobile technologies offer. There is an increased immediacy not only
of  news  breaking  and  delivery  but  also  of  readers’/viewers’/listeners’/users’
contributions  and  reactions  to  journalistic  outputs.  Most  publications  have  online
editions and offer  their readers  the opportunity to comment on articles.  At least in
theory, online comments have the same, if not more significant democratic potential,
than the traditional letters-to-the-editor. They provide an arena “for public discussion
by  regular  citizens  and  can  be  seen  as  a  key  institution  of  the  public  sphere”
(Habermas,  1989,  as  quoted  in  Wahl-Jorgensen,  2002,  p.  69).  However,  studies
focused  on comments  (e.g.,  Richardson & Stanyer,  2011)  explore  the  situation in
established democracies or nondemocratic societies (Zhou, Chan, & Peng, 2008) and
reach largely pessimistic conclusions—that “the deliberative democratic potential of
online discussion is a long way from the deliberative ideal” (Richardson & Stanyer,
2011, p. 983).
What this article intends to do is to bridge the gap between what appear to be two
distinctive developments and bodies of research—a worrying trend toward decreasing
media freedom and pluralism in Eastern and Central Europe, on one hand, and the
alleged empowerment of media audiences, on the other hand. The study will focus on
Bulgaria—a country where these trends are most pronounced and also representative
of  the  region  (Štětka,  2012).  The  focus  will  be  further  narrowed  down  to  the
comments published under articles explicitly discussing the media war between the
biggest corporations. Key questions this article aims to answer are as follows: What
role do these largely negative stories play in the relationship between newspapers and
their readers and to what extent do they enhance the alleged democratic potential of
online discussion? Does the public agenda as evidenced in comments differ from the
media  agenda  as  demonstrated  in  newspaper  articles?  The  expectation  is  that  the
alleged democratic potential will be stronger on this topic, because media freedom and
pluralism are  a  key  aspect  of  any  democracy  and  therefore  something  even  more
greatly valued and cherished in a new democracy, which has only recently “regained”
these key freedoms.
Literature Review
Newspapers’ Online Discussion Boards—Democratic Tools or 
Tribunes for “Unashamed Bigotry”?
The  increased  use  of  online  platforms,  applications,  and  tools  by  journalists  and
citizens  has  indisputably  led  to  increased  academic  interest.  Numerous  studies
investigate the challenges mainstream media have faced and the subsequent changes
they have made, including in their relationship with audiences. The current study will
make  a  contribution  to  this  body of  research.  It  will  delve  deeper  into  the  wider
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political  and social  implications of  these  changes.  More often  than not  journalism
studies  have  remained  journalism-centric—mainly  revolving  around  the  ultimate
question of “What does this mean for the future of journalism and journalists?” As
important and valid this question is, we should not forget that there is the related and
perhaps more fundamental question of, as David Marsh (2012) puts it, has the digital
age rewritten the role of journalism? We cannot really answer this question without
investigating the role journalism plays (or should play) in democratic societies.
Why are readers’ opinions important? Wahl-Jorgensen claims that the letters-to-
the-editor  sections in  newspapers  provide arenas  for  “public  discussion by regular
citizens” and can, therefore, be potentially regarded as “a key institution of the public
sphere”  (Habermas,  1989; Wahl-Jorgensen,  2002, p.  69).  Hence,  we can infer  that
online comments play a similar (or perhaps even stronger) role due to the more limited
gatekeeping and moderation. Not only do they provide opportunities for newspapers to
develop and “reform” their relationships with readers  but they also give citizens a
voice in the public debate (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2002, p. 69). By “providing opportunities
for  critical  debate,”  media  institutions  play  a  dual  positive  role—They  facilitate
participation  in  democratic  “conversations”  and  enhance  citizens’  role  as  active
participants in critical debates (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2002, p. 78).
However, as Richardson and Stanyer (2011) recognize in a U.K. study of online
comments, “the deliberative democratic potential of online discussion is a long way
from the deliberative ideal” (p. 983). They conclude “that the vast majority of reader
comments  and arguments  failed even basic standards  of  reasonableness”  and most
comments,  even in broadsheets  involve point  scoring and name calling and are  “a
paradigm example of how not to engage in critical discussion” (Richardson & Stanyer,
2011,  p.  995).  Similarly,  observers  in  the  United  States  note  that  anonymous
comments are “a place where unashamed bigotry is all too easy to find” (Washington
as quoted in Santana, 2014, p. 20). Researchers in China (Zhou et al., 2008), however,
identify an opposite trend—most comments are “in consensus” and do not disagree
with or offend previous “posters” (p.  767).  This difference  alone demonstrates  the
importance  of  accounting  for  the  level  of  democratization  of  a  country  when
evaluating the democratic “reality” of online discussion.
Equally  important  is  to  acknowledge  that  lots  of  studies  reach  pessimistic
conclusions,  because  their  investigations  are  rigidly  based  on  Habermas’s
romanticized  normative  ideal  of  the  public  sphere  (Dahlberg,  2001;  Papacharissi,
2002).  Useful  attempts  to  measure  “deliberativeness”  have  been  made,1 but
Papacharissi (2002) reminds us that scholars often fall into the trap of idealizing the
public sphere as “a domain of our social life in which public opinion could be formed
out of rational  public debate and . .  .  could lead to public agreement  and decision
making” (p. 11).
However,
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. . . a new public space is not synonymous with a new public sphere. As public space, the
internet  provides  yet  another  forum  for  political  deliberation.  As  public  sphere,  the
internet  could facilitate discussion that promotes a  democratic exchange of  ideas and
opinions.  A virtual  space  enhances  discussion;  a  virtual  sphere enhances  democracy.
(Papacharissi, 2002, p. 11)
Similarly,  Dahlberg’s  (2001)  analysis  shows  that  although  “vibrant  exchange  of
positions and rational critique does take place within many online fora,” a number of
factors such as the increasing commodification of cyberspace, minimal reflexivity, a
lack of respectful listening, and social inequalities limit the expansion of the virtual
public  sphere.  All  these  are  sets  of  conditions  formulated  in  Habermas’s  original
study.
Nonetheless, as Papacharissi (2002) argues, “people who would never be able to
come together to discuss political matters offline are now able to do so online, and that
is no small matter” (p. 22). Dahlgren (2005) also warns that
while it is  important to keep a clear perspective and not exaggerate the extent of the
activities or their impact, it would also be foolish to underestimate what seems to be a
major development in the contemporary history of Western democracy. (p. 160)
This is largely the view this article adopts: Even if it  is highly unlikely to find an
idealized virtual public sphere in the Bulgarian context, it is still important to consider
the  extent  to  which  readers  engage  in  discussions  of  political  and  democratic
importance.  Moreover,  as  Freelon  (2010)  reminds  us,  the  Internet  “can  support
democracy” (p. 1183) in different ways, and the deliberative model offers one (albeit
not the only one) possible explanation.
The Internet’s  role is  potentially even more  important  in Eastern Europe’s  new
democracies  because  of  the  generally  weaker  civil  societies  there  (“a  lasting
feature”—European  Union  Center  of  Excellence,  n.  d.)  and  therefore,  fewer
opportunities for citizens’ contribution to the public sphere. Although the European
Union  and  the  United  States  have  invested  significant  efforts  and  funding  into
nongovernmental  organizations (NGOs),  civil society is still very weak in Bulgaria
due to the low rate of civil involvement (Howard, 2003). It is beyond the scope of this
article  to  trace  the  reasons  behind  this,  but  suffice  it  to  say  that  “a  mistrust  of
communist organizations, the persistence of friendship networks, and post-communist
disappointment” (Howard, 2003, p. 12) have all contributed to it. Beissinger (2012)
argues, however, that in countries with weak civil societies, “virtual” civil society can
play a much stronger role—It “may function as a substitute, providing the basis for
civic activism even in the presence of an anemic conventional civil society” (p. 1).
Dahlberg  (2001)  also  recognizes  that  the  development  of  online  deliberation  is
inherently linked to a range of offline structural factors. He claims that “offline social
and cultural conditions” (Dahlberg, 2001, p. 628) hinder online deliberation. However,
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in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  briefly  mentions  one  case  from  a  non-Western
nondemocratic country, most of his case studies are from Western democracies. Given
that  inequalities  in  the  distribution of  social  resources  are  more  prominent  in  less
developed  new democracies  such  as  Bulgaria,  we can  assume that  we are  highly
unlikely to observe an ideal version of the public sphere there.
Another claim that Dahlberg (2001) makes but does not fully explore is that in an
ideal  virtual public sphere,  “discourse must be driven by the concerns of publicly-
oriented citizens rather than by money or administrative power” (p. 623). He seems to
imply that independence from direct state and commercial interests in itself guarantees
publicly driven discourse. Is this really the case? Agenda-setting theory suggests that
this relationship between policy makers, the mass media, and the public is much more
complicated. Its main premise is that the press “may not be successful much of the
time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers
what  to  think about”  (Cohen,  1963,  p.  13),  but  “there  is  undoubtedly a  two-way,
mutually dependent relationship between the public agenda and the media agenda”
(Rogers & Dearing, 1988, p. 571). Although this study is not representative and does
not aim to fully investigate this relationship, it is worth to at least briefly compare the
media agenda with the public agenda as expressed by readers in our sample. We can
do  that  by  exploring  the  topics  and  themes  that  attract  more  interest  and
argumentation. Zhou et al. (2008) argue that “topicality” is important because “the
content  of  the  dialogue  or  the  topics  that  are  discussed  .  .  .  is  one  of  the  key
characteristics of the political public sphere” (p. 762). Do readers discuss the same
topics as suggested in the articles or do they consider other issues important as well?
A key indicator of the extent to which the democratic potential of online discussion
is realized is the quality of argumentation. Richardson and Stanyer (2011) argue that
“a  fundamental  cooperative  principle  underwriting  a  reasonable  argumentative
discussion is that participants open themselves up to the possibility of having their
opinion changed  by the  standpoint  and  reasoning  of  other  participants”  (p.  1000).
Other academics (Papacharissi, 2004; Ziegele & Quiring, 2010) offer a less idealized
understanding  of  democratic  deliberation.  Papacharissi  (2004)  endorses  Lyotard’s
view of “democratic emancipation through disagreement and anarchy” and argues that
rude comments  by their  very nature do not hinder democratic  debate.  Uncivil  and
offensive comments, however, have a detrimental impact. Papacharissi (2004) defines
incivility as “the set of behaviors that threaten democracy, deny people their personal
freedoms, and stereotype social groups” (p. 267). This article will therefore investigate
the quality of argumentation by using a mixed methods approach—by reporting the
level  of  negativity  in  the  comments  and looking closely at  how the conversations
evolve. Argumentation is defined as follows:
A  written  or  verbal  exchange  of  views  between  the  parties  with  the  aim  of  either
justifying or refuting a standpoint in order to settle a difference of opinion (Atkin and
Richardson, 2007). Even more succinctly, argumentation is a process whereby claims are
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attacked and defended and differences of opinion resolved. (Richardson & Stanyer, 2011,
p. 986)
The  presentation  of  findings  will  be  structured  around  the  three  key  issues
discussed above: (a) level of engagement, (b) topicality and potential differences in
agendas (public vs. media), and (c) degree and quality of argumentation.
“Mini-Murdochs” of the East—Journalism in the New 
Democracies of Eastern and Central Europe
The demise of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 to 1991 led to rapid
trends  toward  democratization,  including  liberalization  of  media  markets.  These
developments  attracted  increased  interest  in  the  region.  As  Hume  (2011)  claims,
“recognizing  the  importance  of  the  media  in  bringing  about  democratic  changes,
intensive Western democracy aid poured in to help create independent media” (p. 9).
Initially a clear upward trend was evident—democratization and media independence,
freedom  and  pluralism  went  hand  in  hand  (Hume,  2011;  Jakubowics,  2012).  A
worrying regional pattern has emerged since 2008—the withdrawal of international
media investors “selling out to local entrepreneurs who are interested in harvesting the
political potential of these now-established media venues” (Hume, 2011, p. 6). Štětka
(2012) argues that the region is now “plagued by their own mini-Murdochs2—and in
these more fragile democracies, they represent an even bigger threat.” Why are local
entrepreneurs “dangerous”? These questions can be best answered if we look closely
at one case study—the Bulgarian “Murdoch of the East” (Štětka, 2012).
The two biggest players in the Bulgarian press market are MGB and NBMG. Until
December  2010,  MGB was  owned by  the  German newspaper  group WAZ.  WAZ
bought the two biggest  selling national dailies in 1996 and in next 10 to 15 years
“totally dominated” the market (Tabakova, 2014). This changed in 2007 when NBMG
—a company allegedly related to the party of “the ethnic Turkish minority”—emerged
in the market (Tabakova, 2014). It expanded so rapidly that commentators now worry
about the “gradual concentration of a large part of Bulgarian news media” in its hands
(Štětka, 2012).
The corporation is headed by “the controversial duo of Irena Krasteva, the former
head of the Bulgarian State Lottery—lacking any previous media experience—and her
son  Delyan  Peevski,  who is  an MP for  the  Movement  for  Rights  and  Freedoms”
(Štětka, 2012). Peevski started his political career at the age of 21 when appointed as
Parliamentary  Secretary  to  the  Minister  of  Transport  and  Chair  of  the  Board  of
Directors  of  the  biggest  port  (“Кариерата  на  Делян  Пеевски,”  2011).  At  25,  he
became deputy minister and has been an elected MP since 2009. Numerous rumors
have circulated about his property portfolio, tax evasion strategies, and allegations that
his company has been financed by banker Tsvetan Vasilev. The former government
has  been  accused  of  “indirectly  subsidizing  {Peevski’s}  conglomerate  through
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deposits by state entities” in Vasilev’s bank (Freedom House, 2014). EurActiv (2014)
describes  Peevski  as  follows:  “A  symbol  of  the  shady  power  brokerage  that  has
impoverished Bulgarians, and ruined the country’s reputation.” Public pressure against
Peevski  escalated  in  2013  when  he  was  appointed  head  of  the  State  Agency  for
National Security. This appointment prompted a mass wave of public protests, which
“almost  brought  down  the  then  two-week  old  government”  (EurActiv,  2014).
Parliament’s vote was reversed, but Peevski’s political career has recently gone from
strength to strength when he was elected as an MEP in May 2014 but chose to remain
an MP.
Peevski’s  “verbal  war”  with  MGB openly  started  after  WAZ  sold  its  titles  to
Bulgarian “millionaire tycoons:  Ognian Donev, chairman and executive director  of
Bulgaria’s biggest pharmaceutical company, and Lyubomir Pavlov, a former banker”
and politician (Langley, 2013). Soon after the deal, Pavlov and Donev were charged
with fraud and money laundering. Their rivals also published “transcripts of alleged
phone  conversations  that  indicate  Bonev  and  Pavlov  have  undue  influence  with
leading political figures” and “an investigation alleging that Pavlov used real estate he
owned  in  the  French  Cote  d’Azur  to  launder  money”  (Langley,  2013).  The  war
between the two press groups was led on the pages of their newspapers and on TV.
Journalists and academics have strongly condemned these developments by arguing
that  “media  freedom  and  pluralism”  are  in  “jeopardy”  (Štětka,  2012),  because
investigative and “true” reporting is endangered when “tycoons have been buying up
media outlets and appearing to exert  editorial control” to further their political and
business interests (Langley, 2013). However, an important question not yet asked is,
What  role  do  these  largely  negative  stories  play  in  the  relationship  between
newspapers and their readers and to what extent do online discussion boards enhance
the alleged  “deliberative  democratic  potential  of  online discussion” (Richardson &
Stanyer, 2011, p. 983)?
Method
The study uses a mixed methods approach. It combines quantitative content analysis
with qualitative thematic analysis.  The initial  sample consisted of the four biggest
selling dailies owned by NMBG and MGB—Telegraph, Monitor, Trud, and 24 Chasa.
Telegraph was first in circulation in 2011 with 105,000 copies, followed by Trud with
85,000 copies, then  24 Chasa with 70,000 copies, and  Monitor with 15,000 copies
(Štětka,  2012).  The  intention  was  to  download  all  articles  (and  the  comments
underneath) containing the names of the (alleged) owners (and associates)—NMBG’s
Irena Krasteva and Delyan Peevski and their alleged supporter Tsvetan Vasilev, and
MGB’s owners Lyubomir Pavlov and Ognian Donev. However, NMBG’s newspapers
had  to  be  subsequently  excluded  because  Telegraph does  not  publish  any  articles
online—only a screen shot of their front page.  Monitor, however, publishes articles
online, but does not allow comments under them. Therefore, the final sample consisted
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only of comments published under the articles in 24 Chasa and Trud. This is a major
limitation but one that  cannot  be overcome because  it  is  a  reflection of the actual
situation.  None  of  the  editions  published  by  the  MP’s  company  allow readers  to
express their opinions. To post comments in 24 Chasa and Trud, users have to either
register (only email addresses are required) or log in via Facebook, Yahoo, AOL, or
Hotmail. Verification emails are not sent out, and there is no reference to editorial
policies.
Owners’  names  were  published  in  387 articles  in  Trud and  24 Chasa between
December 2010 and May 2013—when Pavlov and Donev’s company owned MGB.
The total number of comments was 5,305. All articles were coded in SPSS with the
aim of identifying the main themes. To allow for a more in-depth qualitative analysis
of the comments, their number was further reduced to only those comments published
under the 53 articles explicitly discussing the media war—1,583 comments. All 1,583
comments were initially quantitatively coded in SPSS and then thematically analyzed
in NVivo. This two-stage process allowed for an initial screening and quantification
based  on  a  coding  schedule  adapted  from  previous  research  (Richardson,  2008;
Richardson & Stanyer, 2011). Some of the categories for coding were main topic of
the article, main theme of the comment, author’s pseudonym, engagement with other
readers, tone of the comment, tone toward newspaper, and so on (operational details of
all coding variables are available separately). Nine percent of the sample (randomly
selected)  was  recoded  by an independent  second coder.  As Table 1 demonstrates,
intercoder reliability was within the acceptable limits.
The  qualitative  analysis  then  allowed  for  a  more  in-depth  investigation  of  the
degree of and quality of argumentation as well as the main themes emerging from the
comments. “The data are read for analytical themes, which are listed” (Fielding, 2001,
p.  159)  in  two  stages:  initial  coding  and  focused  coding.  This  combination  of
quantitative  content  analysis3 and  qualitative  thematic  analysis  served  a  twofold
purpose—the  probing  and  “testing”  of  prior  expectations  as  revealed  in  previous
research and the unveiling of new trends and themes (a grounded theory approach),
which led to new theoretical and empirical insights.
Newspapers’ Online Discussion Boards—Democratic Tools or 
Conspiracy Theories’ Engines?
Engagement.  The 53 articles explicitly discussing the media war attracted 278,787
views or 5,260 views per article; 1,583 comments or 30 comments on average per
article were posted. A very small proportion of readers actually commented—0.6% of
those  who  viewed  the  articles;  60.5%  involved  some  level  of  
Table 1.Intercoder Reliability.
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Variable
Simple
agreement
%
Krippendorff’s
alpha (calculated
in SPSS 21)
Keywords 93.7 .8812
Engagement with other readers/users 93 .8563
Tone toward newspaper in which the article is 
published
91 .8400
Tone toward keyword actor(s) 97.2 .8699
Tone toward newspaper’s owner(s) 88.8 .8159
Overall tone 93 .6840
Note. A full operationalization of the variables is available in Online Appendix 1.
Table 2. Main Topics of Discussion.
Topic
Newspa
per
articles
(%)
Reader
comments
(%)
TV presenter Nikolay Barekov’s tearing to pieces of Trud 
live on air 
11.8 25.8
Distribution scandal 25.5 20
Public appearances of owner Lyubomir Pavlov 31.4 18.8
Die Welt’s article about the state of the media market in 
Bulgaria
4 6
Note. Percentages do not add up to 100% because other topics have also been discussed.
engagement with other readers, which on the surface is perhaps a good indicator of the
deliberative  democratic  potential.  Both  figures  suggest  a  much  higher  level  of
engagement that was demonstrated by readers in Western democracies (Richardson &
Stanyer,  2011).  24 Chasa’s  readers  were  engaging  more  actively  with  each  other
(64.6%) than Trud’s readers (55%). The difference is statistically significant (Pearson
χ2 = 16.576,  df = 3,  p = .001). However, the fact that more than half of the readers
engaged  in some “conversations”  is  not  in  itself  evidence  of  argumentation  but  it
suggests that conversations between readers take place in the online space, supporting
Papacharissi’s  (2002)  claim  that  online  fora  can  be  important  spaces  for  political
conversations.
Topicality and agenda setting? Four main topics discussed in the articles attracted
readers’  comments  (Table  2).  There  is  a  slight  mismatch  between  the  topics
newspapers prioritized and the ones readers were interested in. Although nearly a third
of  the  articles  were  about  owner  Lyubomir  Pavlov—related  either  to  the  money
laundering and fraud charges or to his legal battles—readers discussed this topic in
only 18.8% of their comments. By contrast,  readers  devoted more attention to TV
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presenter Nikolay Barekov’s tearing to pieces of Trud live on air. Bakerov’s TV show
is aired by TV7—a channel owned by NBMG.
Are there any other topics that readers find interesting but newspapers do not really
discuss?  Ten  broader  overlapping  themes  emerge  from  the  qualitative  bottom-up
analysis with two dominating more than half of the comments (Table 3).
Table 3. Themes Emerging From the Qualitative Analysis.
Theme n %
Conspiracy theories 468 29.6
1. Newspapers as paid, servile media
2. Readers as being on “payroll” at a rival press group
3. Overriding plot and/or all-powerful actor (e.g., a politician)
Journalism: 430 27.2
1. “Real” journalism
2. “Ideal” journalism
TV presenter Nikolay Barekov 208 13.1
Media ownership and owners 175 11.1
The role of the state and/or politicians and political parties 175 11.1
Explicit hatred 114 7.2
Censorship and/or freedom of expression 112 7.1
Emotive reaction to the fate of given newspapers 99 6.3
The European Union and the West 83 5.2
Readers’ empowerment 34 2.2
Note. Percentages do not add up to 100 because of overlaps between the themes.
Readers attempt to put slightly different issues on the agenda or at least a different
spin to the interpretations offered by newspapers.  Thus, although most articles  are
very  black  and  white—with  a  clear  villain  (the  rival  owner/newspaper)  and  hero
(“our” owner/newspaper)—comments are much more nuanced. Nearly a third engage
in “conspiracy theories” narratives,  namely, they make attempts to see through the
alleged facts and reach to the bottom of the problem/issue at stake. Very often these
conspiracy theories offer a damning verdict on journalism in Bulgaria. Journalism and
its relationship with democracy are explicitly discussed in more than a quarter of the
comments.  A  key  difference  between  readers’  and  newspapers’  narratives  is  the
evaluation of the state of journalism in Bulgaria.
When  discussing  the  current  state  of  journalism  (“real  journalism”)  and  their
expectations about what journalism should be about (“ideal journalism”), most readers
are very critical:
Paisii: If  somebody  shows  me  even  a  single  journalist  who  cannot  be
bribed and even  one independent  medium, they will  get  a  Nobel
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prize from me for invention. Journalists have been and will always
be dependent on someone or something.
Atanasova: If it’s a journalist (Bulgarian)—spit on him and ignore him. Nasty,
low, uneducated, mercenary brood. They are not worth a damn.
Nearly half of the comments make strong allegations about payments to journalists
or  journalists  serving  their  owners.  Further  30%  make  claims  about  poor
professionalism—mainly of their own newspapers (i.e., the ones in which they post
comments). Very few actually discuss the quality of rival newspapers. In some of the
threads,  readers  do  not  only  criticize  certain  journalistic  practices,  but  they  also
compare them with the ideals they believe in. Moreover, prompted by the perceived
bad  quality,  they  discuss  journalistic  values  and  ideals,  such  as  objectivity  and
impartiality, serving the public interest:
Elina Angelova: Misunderstood journalism! When did objectivity and the search
for  impartiality  disappear?  I’m  tired  of  reading  manipulative
articles, twisting the truth to serve the respective editorial office.
This  is  not  journalism.  This  is  an  attack  over  freedom  of
expression  forced  to  trade  with  its  body  to  please  the  sick
ambitions of those who have enough money to buy it.
Pushit: The publication is rubbish—couldn’t you just ask both sides like
they do in normal journalism—it’s a pity!
Rasputin: Bulgarian journalists will sell their mother’s milk for money and
power!!!  What  a  shame!!!  It’s  not  the  journalists’  job  to  be
watchdogs of society at any cost! This can be a main task for a
rascal  who has waved journalism and critiques power to enter
into  it  (when  the  criticized  fall  down).  The  task  of  REAL
JOURNALISM,  you  bedpan,  IS  TO  SERVE  THE  PUBLIC
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST! That’s it!
The tone of 87.1% of all comments is negative and only 2.2% are positive. Quite
tellingly,  in 35.8% the tone toward the newspaper the comment is  published in is
negative  and  in  3.3%  positive.  Very  few  readers  (2.7%)  openly  defend  their
newspapers and further 3.2% say that what is happening to their newspaper is “a pity”
or “a shame.” Even though the majority of articles depict rival owners in a negative
light  (72% of  the headlines  include negative references),  the comments  indicate  a
different trend. The tone toward rival owners is negative in only 20.3% of comments
but  a  higher  proportion  (37.9%)  include  negative  references  to  the  respective
newspaper’s owners. This trend is even more pronounced in comments under articles
with  positive  headlines  about  owners;  27.5% of  the  articles  had  a  headline  about
Pavlov or Donev. The tone toward them in 52% of the comments is negative and in
14.3% positive.
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The qualitative analysis further illustrates why readers feel this way:
Kiki: I’ve  had  enough  of  oligarchs  such  as  Papkata  {Pavlov}  and
Donev.  I  will  personally  stop  reading  24  Chasa and  Trud
because true journalism in Bulgaria passed away.
Stoyan Georgiev: I know there are normal people who work in 24 {Chasa} but I’m
asking myself what motivation they’ve got to go to work after
their bosses insist on them publishing such things and signing
them off  with the title of  the newspaper.  It  seems a lot  more
shameful to say that you work for Papkata and Donev than to
clean septic holes.  Wow! What times arrived and there was a
time when it was prestigious to work for 24 {Chasa} or Trud.
Readers are disenchanted and disappointed and they blame the new owners for that. A
few explicitly mention the fact that their newspapers have turned their own owners,
and their own fate into the main subject of their stories shows how distanced they are.
Readers’ verdict is damning:
Ordinary man4: Ladies  and  gentlemen,  so-called  journalists,  as  an  ordinary
person, parent, and user of medicines, I couldn’t care less about
your hurt pride. I don’t want to pay for the medicines of foreign
people and countries. Aren’t you ashamed of yourselves? Instead
of covering this genocide against the Bulgarian people with this
criminal medicine policy, you behave like pinched ladies who
have lost their virginity ages ago and now offer paid-for love.
You truly deserve this attitude.
Kuna P.: It’s a pity how authoritative editions are engulfed in the personal
and  business  battles  between  some  controversial  big
businessmen.
Aristocrat: The fight for viewers and readers reached its culmination—that’s
why they decided to drive the whole society crazy. I don’t want
to know about your problems every minute and hour of the day,
you pseudo journalists, who have distanced themselves from real
problems and have  focused  so much on your owners’  issues!
How  much  circulation  goes  down  the  toilets  of  millions  of
Bulgarians and this is the greatest use of the so-called journalism
so that we have to deal with a torn-up newspaper? The truth is
simple—No one trusts you, people are just having fun. The fact
that  you become child-like,  playing fascists and partisans will
not move anyone!
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Ordinary man, Kuna, P., and the aristocrat’s comments exemplify a common trend
—in their attempts to defend themselves in their battle with their rivals, 24 Chasa and
Trud have clearly lost some of their readers’ trust. However, there are still readers who
attempt to defend the professionalism and integrity of their newspapers. They do that
not just by praising their newspaper but also by attacking the “enemy”:
Citizen5: The job of independent publishers is not easy—even in the forums
the media monopolist Peevski is paying unemployed losers to spit
on and destroy the reputation to force them to sell their papers for
petty cash!!! But the truth always wins!!!
Zhoro: A very good and meaningful material, a truthful one,  Trud and  24
Chasa remain the only independent and opposition newspapers in
Bulgaria which were brave enough to stand up to the whole simple-
mindness  taking  place  in  our  country.  And  those  who  write
comments  against  them  are  APPARENTLY  PAID  BY  THE
CHEAP NEWSPAPERS. I FEEL SORRY FOR THEM!
Presko: If you think the articles are manipulative, why do you keep reading
them? I aim to inform myself from different sources and to make my
own truth. The truth is not Delyan Peevski’s.
The last post in this thread raises an interesting issue about readers’ identity. A few
readers defending 24 Chasa and Trud ask a similar question, and in turn those who do
not  like  the  two  newspapers  often  claim  that  they  are  not  “readers”  of  these
newspapers because they do not buy them.
Ginev: Why do you read them then? I like their content. You are in their
forum, writing, this means you like them.
Roshav: You are very stupid, man. Your way of expression shows this.
The fact that someone writes somewhere is not because he likes
it but because some emotion has come onto him. I doubt it that
the  people  who write  about  the  dead  girl  in  England do that
because they like the news. You are so elementary. And Lubo
and Ogi can be shot; without them the press will be revitalized
and then we can truly talk about freedom of expression and truth
in the media.
Ginev to Roshav: Your way of expressing yourself is much more literary. Just to
explain—when we talk about freedom of expression and we hide
Peevski, this is not a coincidence.
This  thread  poses  an  interesting  question  of  whether  it  is  time  to  redefine  our
understanding of the term “reader” but it ends up on a familiar note—strong opinions
about media owners. The above comments provide invaluable insights into readers’
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views on journalism and on the surface appear to drive democratic debate forward. All
in all, the data suggest that the public agenda as evidenced in our sample differs or
even deviates from the media agenda: (a) Readers have reordered the salience of the
topics—They devote more attention to topics deemed less interesting by the media. (b)
Readers put forward new topics. The last thread also gives us an indication of the
nature of these conversations—Issues are discussed and counterarguments addressed
but in fairly limited ways—Habermas’s ideals of the public sphere are clearly not met
so it is reasonable to assume that what we observe is closer to Papacharissi’s (2002)
notion of a virtual space that enhances discussion. A common approach is for readers
not to fully deal with the previous comment but instead to swiftly try to change the
direction of the conversation to a topic advancing their own argument.
Degree and Quality of Argumentation
We already explored 1 of the 10 topics identified in the bottom-up analysis—the state
of journalism, so we will now focus on the second one—conspiracy theories. Readers
put forward three interlinked theories. According to the first one (44.7%),  24 Chasa
and  Trud are  paid,  servile  newspapers—serving  external  political  and  corporate
interests:
Ifihadagan: This is the nth preordered material in 24 Chasa and Trud.
Cveti: This has been known for a while—why do you bring up the issue
now  .  .  .  every  newspaper  is  connected  with  some  party  or
personality  and  everything  they  publish  is  in  the  interest  of
somebody .  .  .  24 Chasa and  Trud were  owned and still  are  by
Donev—the biggest fraudster who launders money, and has become
even richer at the expense of poor people and what happened—he
bought himself media to hide him, to speculate, and to advertise him
. . . But we are not a brainless herd like all big “guys” think and we
don’t trust everything blindly.
Desi: Preordered manipulative nonsense—yet again. You are trying to do
something  which  proves  even  more  that  Donev  and  Pavlov  are
guilty, it has the opposite effect to the one you desire, don’t you see
that?
Cveti’s thesis about the media’s manipulative role is echoed in follow-up posts, but
readers  tend  to  disagree  in  their  evaluation  of  which  newspaper/journalist/media
owner is manipulative. Instead of attempting to resolve their differences, they often
put forward a second conspiracy (40%)—that everyone holding an alternative opinion
is on “payroll” at the rival press group. These threads involve active conversations, but
although on the surface readers appear to address each other, including by using their
pseudonyms, the posts do not involve much evidence of argumentative activity.
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Ivan.yanev: Plamene,  my  boy,  don’t  take  yourself  so  seriously—you  have
occupied  all  forums,  it’s  clear  that  you’ve  just  started  this  job
because you are not simply writing but firing a volley of posts. You
suspect others of being guilty of your own behavior, following the
principle: “the thief says catch the thief.”
Plamen 1972: I haven’t stolen a thing but unfortunately I have to buy expensive
medicines because of monopoly. How about you?
Plamen 1972: I haven’t occupied all forums either—you write only in  24 Chasa
and  Trud because you are on payroll  and I’m having fun. I keep
looking at other media from time to time, unlike you. Don’t look at
them, don’t look at the comments about your bosses because it will
hurt and you will find out everything. Although you look like an
intelligent person and you probably know it. Yours is causa perdutta
—and the more rubbish you write instead of keeping silent, the more
you dig deeper into the s...t
Marina.y: Apparently,  this is Plamen 1972’s personal forum. It’s a shame, I
thought that there is a discussion here but as it turns out he is a paid
fan of the competition . . . I’ll come back later.
Although readers engaged in a conversation, this is the kind of conversation that hinders
rather than facilitates argumentation. Plamen 1972 and Ivan.yanev did not really try to
justify or refute “a standpoint in order to settle a difference of opinion” (Richardson &
Stanyer,  2011).  Instead  they  “fired”  accusations  at  each  other.  These  accusations
preempted any meaningful discussion because they were underwritten by a lack of trust
and allegations about lack of objectivity. Plamen 1972 tried to bring up an issue that could
have  potentially  led  to  some  meaningful  discussion—the  high  prices  of  medicines.
However,  Ivan.yanev did not respond. The reaction of the third reader who ended the
conversation  was  telling.  This  example  demonstrates  a  common  trend—although  in
quantitative terms the level of engagement  is  high because readers  acknowledge each
other’s  posts and address  each other,  the qualitative analysis reveals  that  the level  of
argumentation and democratic potential is fairly limited. These are not arguments over
substance. They involve personal attacks and accusations, thus giving birth to or feeding
conspiracy  theories.  They were  not  just  rude  but  also impolite  and  uncivil,  thus  not
enhancing but hindering democratic conversation (Papacharissi, 2004).
The  third  “conspiracy  theory”  (22.7%)  includes  claims  about  an  overriding
plot/conspiracy by an all-powerful actor (most commonly a politician or a businessman):
Igita: It looks as if she is really making money. 6pm came and she said
“bye.” This means she posts for Vasilev. BTW, she attacks the right-
wing billionaires but she doesn’t know that it’s exactly Ivan Kostov
{former right-wing PM} who created the wonder Vasilev and Boyko
{PM} made him king.
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Desy: I was last writing at 17.49, not 18, can I take my child for a peaceful
walk  on  Sunday  evening?  Exactly  because  I’m  not  financially
connected to any people, that is, I am not “a poster” on payroll, I
couldn’t care less about the one with the moustache {Vasilev} and I
don’t  like  the  fat  one  {Peevski}.  Unlike  you,  I  am  not  serving
anyone. It’s a pity for you, you are in such a poor state exactly like
your bosses Donev and Pavlov.
Igita: Desy, no need to excuse yourself. What was the walk like? Which
park did you go to? Has Boyko {the PM} fixed the lighting?
Igita: Desy,  if  you  are  trying  to  convince  us  in  anything,  this  is  your
problem. No one can persuade anyone else in the forums, people
simply express their opinion. And mine is that people like Lyubomir
Pavlov, with all his conditionalities, if he succeeds in suing the silly
yellow editions of Peevski, then he would have done at least  one
good deed, because the Fat one started becoming very detrimental
for freedom of expression. And if you deny that, you are a weak
journalist and the conversation with you is meaningless.
Yet again even if any arguments were put forward with the aim of justifying or
refuting  a  standpoint,  the  thread  ended with accusations  about  “dependency.”  The
more personal and uncivil the attacks became, the more difficult it was for readers to
engage in argumentation. Some of the key traits of ideal deliberation such as ideal role
taking and civility were not present (Dahlberg, 2001; Papacharissi, 2004). The final
answer touches upon wider issues such as owners’ impact on freedom of expression,
which could potentially attract  a  democratic  debate.  Unfortunately,  none of  the 14
subsequent comments elaborated on this issue. Instead the few immediate follow-up
posts were focused on the personalities of the rival media owners as if deliberately
shifting  attention  away  from Peevski  and  his  role.  This  seemed  to  be  a  common
technique. Instead of addressing concerns,  many shifted attention to the rival press
group/owners.  Very rarely would anyone defend “their” press group and/or owner,
attack seemed to be the best defense.
Did  the  second  broader  theme—readers’  verdict  on  journalism—provide  more
opportunities for deliberation? Unfortunately, although readers brought up important
issues  such  as  censorship  and  freedom  of  expression,  ownership  and  editorial
interference as well as the role of the state and of the European Union, the quality of
argumentation was far from ideal—These ideas and ideals were rarely picked up in
subsequent posts.
Conclusion
This  study shows that  although a very small  proportion of  online readers  actually
comment  on  newspaper  articles,  still  in  comparison  with  established  democracies
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considerably  more  Bulgarians  engage  in  conversations.  The  average  number  of
comments per article in Richardson and Stanyer’s (2011) study of U.K. newspapers
was 18.62 in contrast to 30 in this study. Moreover, the percentage of readers who
engage in dialogue and debate with each other is also considerably higher—60.5% as
opposed to 31.3% of broadsheet readers and 2.3% of tabloid readers in Richardson and
Stanyer’s study. Similarly, unlike the Chinese readers in Zhou et al.’s (2008) study
who are more likely to “present agreement with a given entry instead of proposing
opposing ideas or viewpoints” (p. 767), Bulgarian readers express both agreement and
disagreement. This goes to show that context matters and the more we contextualize,
the better picture we get. The media war in Bulgaria attracted a range of polarized
opinions.
Ten themes emerged from the qualitative analysis of the 1,583 comments—from
conspiracy theories and readers’  opinions on the state  of journalism to discussions
about media tycoons, the role of the state as well as the potential involvement of the
European Union, and the need to protect freedom of expression. Some readers even
opened up more sophisticated debates about their own identity and the “powers” they
have to choose which media to read and how to interpret  messages.  The range of
topics and opinions clearly shows that the online space does indeed provide an arena
“for public discussion by regular citizens and can be seen as a key institution of the
public sphere” (Habermas,  1989; Wahl-Jorgensen,  2002, p.  69).  However,  a closer
look reveals that the quality of argumentation is not very high. A lot of these issues of
significant importance in any democracy were mentioned but not really followed up.
Instead attention was diverted to the identity of the media owners as well as various
conspiracy  theories  that  questioned  both  readers’  and  journalists’  objectivity  and
therefore stifled any proper discussion. Although most comments were fairly negative,
the “unashamed bigotry”  or  “explicit  hatred” was not  that  common (7.2%).  Name
calling and swearing occurred but did not dominate the majority of posts.
Moreover,  we should also acknowledge that  the offline world is  far  from ideal
(Dahlberg, 2001). This study shows that online discussion boards provide additional
venues  for  democratic  conversations  insofar  as  they  allow citizens  to  bring  up  or
maintain on the public agenda issues of vital importance. The quality of argumentation
is not perfect, but one could argue that it is still to a greater extent better than on the
pages  of  mainstream Eastern  European  papers  that  face  increasing  threats  to  their
pluralism. Some citizens made rudimentary attempts to hold debates about the state of
their media. The “deliberative democratic potential of online discussion” is indeed “a
long way from the deliberative ideal” (Richardson & Stanyer, 2011, p. 983) but we
can argue in a similar way that especially in Bulgaria this is very much the case in the
offline world—Civil  society is  very weak and the political  and media systems are
ridden  by  scandals.  Bulgarian  newspapers’  online  discussion  boards  are  a  new or
alternative  “public  space”  but  they  cannot  be  classified  as  “a  new public  sphere”
(Papacharissi, 2002, p. 11). It is perhaps worth revising the idealized and romanticized
normative  ideal  of  the  public  sphere  as  initially  put  forward  by  Habermas  and
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especially the role virtual spaces that cannot be defined as virtual public spheres play
for  democracy  (Papacharissi,  2002).  Some  scholars  propose  a  move  away  from
Habermas’s  framework  to  more  considerate  frameworks  that  do  not  neglect
“important aspects of the interpersonal communication process” (Eveland, Morey, &
Hutchens,  2011, p.  1082).  These conversations between online readers  do not take
place in a vacuum and other contextual and (inter)personal factors and motivations are
likely to affect the quality of argumentation and democratic deliberation (Eveland et
al.,  2011; Ziegele  & Quiring, 2013).  A full  investigation of  the interplay  of  these
factors can only be conducted if textual analysis is complemented with an audience
study—a task for future research.
Finally, the study’s limitations should be acknowledged. The sample is limited to
the newspapers that allow readers to post comments online, and therefore the study
presents the views of their readers (which are nonetheless among those with highest
circulation). Second, the word limit did not allow us to explore all emerging themes.
Further studies will investigate in greater  depth readers’  views of ideal  versus real
journalism as  well  as  shifting  reader  identities.  It  would  also  be  worth  exploring
readers’ perspectives on media scandals in other countries and contexts.
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Notes
1. Ruiz  et  al.  (2011)  focus  on  logic  and  coherence,  cooperative  search  for  truth  and  an
agreement based on the best argument, whereas Zhou, Chan, and Peng (2008) measure the
quantity of posts and participants, topicality, nature of the argument, and responsiveness and
homogeneity of contributions.
2. Although  Štětka  (2012)  does  not  explicitly  define  the  term  “mini-Murdochs,”  he  calls
Peevski  “the  Murdoch  of  the  East?”  thus  likening  him to  Rupert  Murdoch  presumably
because he operates in a similar way. Peevski’s company owns a large part of Bulgarian
news media and he has “a reputation for unscrupulously serving the government of the day”
in exchange for the backing of his “aggressive price strategy” and “horizontal expansion.”
3. Quantitative  content  analysis  is  “a  research  technique  for  the  objective,  systematic  and
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952, p. 147),
which involves counting the occurrences of content units based on coding manuals.
4. In Bulgarian, “обикновен човек.”
5. In Bulgarian, “гражданин.”
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